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1Introduction
In a keynote speech to a recent conference, Nicolai Foss (1999, p. 5) pointed out
that the distinction between production and exchange approaches to economic
organisation is not very satisfactory, because both contribute to the maximisation
of joint surplus. This, of course, was Menger’s ([1871] 1976) view, though he
preferred to call them both means of meeting human needs. This should
therefore be an appropriate starting point for a workshop on Austrian economics
and the theory of the firm. Menger began with what is now called ‘household
production’, first by direct consumption of what is available and then by indirect
use of goods to produce consumable objects, which in Menger’s scheme
transforms them into goods of higher order; their value in such a use is derived
from the needs that are satisfied. Menger, unlike Walras, thereby provides an
explanation for the structure of prices. Only when the goods which are to hand
cannot be used, either directly or indirectly, for meeting that person’s (or
family’s) needs does exchange begin to be substituted for production. Anything
used for exchange thereby becomes, in Menger’s system, a good of higher order,
and its price is explained accordingly. Eventually we arrive at a still higher order
of goods, which are used in production in order that the products can be
exchanged. Thus production and exchange are not only in a broad sense
substitutes; particular activities of production and exchange are often closely
complementary, and jointly influence the structure of prices. This
complementarity between production and exchange is a theme of this
presentation; and Nicolai, at least, will expect me also to consider in what
respects they are similar (Richardson 1972).
2Equilibrium Explanations
In twentieth-century economics production became part of the theory of
equilibrium, as advocated by Lionel Robbins (1932, p. 70), and in the process
came to be analysed as a special kind of exchange. In fact it is not very special. In
teaching basic microeconomics one set of diagrams is sufficient to represent the
determination of optimal combinations of consumption goods and of inputs into
production; all that is necessary is to relabel the axes. Microeconomics becomes
what is called ‘market theory’, and there is nothing distinctive about firms as
organisations – as has been pointed out often enough. In order to find some
reason for firms to exist in theory (since they do appear to exist in practice) it has
been thought necessary to identify a distinct category of circumstances in which
this ‘market theory’ is inapplicable. Transaction cost theories were invented, and
agency and property rights theories adapted, to do this job.
Now it is noticeable that there are two sorts of conditions which provide
the bases for such theories. The first, which Coase used in 1937 – and has
continued to use – are what might appropriately be called dispersed and
fragmented knowledge; the second, which has become the overwhelming
favourite, is opportunism or, more generally, circumstances in which standard
market contracts do not automatically ensure incentive-compatability. Some
imperfection of knowledge is necessary to make incentive-compatability
problematic within a ‘market-like’ system; but it is imperfection in the allocation
of knowledge between the contracting parties, and theorists are careful to
emphasise – and for good reason – that this imperfection is in itself of no
significance for theory.
Now it is not difficult to understand the revealed preference of economists
for the latter kind of analysis. In a sense, all economics is about incentives; every
economic relationship can be characterised as a principal-agent problem (or,
often, as a symmetrical pair of principal-agent problems: think of the Edgeworth
3box, in which each party seeks to induce the other, by an optimally-designed
contract, to supply desired combinations of goods). Most of these problems are
easily resolved into competitive equilibria, and others into Nash equilibria; but a
sub-category is theoretically solved by some supposedly ‘firm-like’ device, which
is actually an extension of equilibrium theory. (The differences between the
‘firm-like’ devices offered by principal-agent, property rights, and Williamsonian
transaction cost theorists are of second order in the perspective of this
exposition.) Even these extensions, we should note, are a little disturbing to some
purists; but a general admission of incomplete knowledge, including incomplete
knowledge of what is incomplete in other people’s knowledge as well as one’s
own, threatens the whole edifice. How are such models to be closed? The
multiple solutions which often occur in game theory are bad enough.
Another advantage of the preferred formulations is that these apparently
‘firm-like’ devices are implicitly restricted to contracting for already optimised
schemes of production, thus leaving intact the ‘market-like’ analysis that (as
Robbins wished) determines the choice of production techniques, from a
production set which is both completely specified and publicly known to be
public knowledge. The theory of production thus remains part of the theory of
equilibrium; and the allocation of production linkages between ‘firm-like’ and
‘market-like’ contracts – the make or buy decision – is an extension of that
theory. Consequently, the make or buy decision is not actually a decision but an
equilibrium condition. This is characteristic of choice theory, and not
surprisingly, since choice theory is designed to facilitate proofs of equilibrium.
The result of this analytical strategy, as all participants in this workshop
recognise, is a very ‘thin’ theory of the firm.
4Firms and Production
We now have at least the material for a much ‘thicker’ theory of the firm, which
apparently has no connection with transaction-cost explanations of why firms
exist. Indeed, this alternative is actually a new theory of production, which is
emphatically not part of the theory of equilibrium – or, to be more precise, not
part of the allocative equilibrium of price and output; other concepts of
equilibrium (for example, provisional equilibria of theory and policy) may be
appropriate. The organisation of production, including decisions about what to
produce and how to produce it, thus appears to be sharply differentiated from
exchange. For economists, the foundational treatment of this theory is Penrose’s
(1959, 1995) superb book – and rightly so, even though the elements in that book
can be found in a line of illustrious predecessors (Loasby 1999). In fact, this new
theory of production is a reinvention of a theory which had been developed from
Adam Smith to Allyn Young, and then discarded as incompatible with
equilibrium theorising.
Young (1928, p. 528), at least, agreed about the incompatability; and it is of
the first importance that Penrose decided that her theory had to be kept apart
from standard theories of the firm. She made no reference to Coase’s 1937 paper,
and did not ask why firms exist; only in retrospect does any connection become
apparent. (What this connection is will be noted later.) Without this theoretical
separation it would have been impossible for her to take the crucial analytical
step of breaking open the production function in order to distinguish between
inputs and the resources from which those inputs could be derived. This
distinction made it possible to conceive, first of the continuous development of
resources, and then of the intermittent perception, by those who were intimately
acquainted with particular forms of development, of possible new uses for these
5resources as inputs to new production processes – in Menger’s terms, the
creation of new goods of higher order. The perception of new productive
opportunities is described by Penrose as a small-scale version of Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship; these opportunities are new combinations of productive
services, oriented towards ‘the image’ of particular human needs. (Penrose (1959,
p. 5) derived this Shackleian touch from Kenneth Boulding.)
The multi-specificity of resources produces the combination of
substitution between uses and complementarity within uses that is at the core of
Lachmann’s (1978) theory of capital (about which we shall be hearing later); and
the Penrosian development of resources (or, in Richardson’s (1972) terminology,
capabilities) provides scope for differences between internal and external
valuation (on implicitly Mengerian principles) which writers on strategy are
looking for. However, by endowing firms with permanently differentiated
capabilities, which sustain defensible rents, strategists have returned to
equilibrium; and those among them who evoke the name of Penrose are in
serious error, for there is nothing permanent about the particular advantages of a
Penrosian firm.
Firms and Exchange
Though the demands of these new combinations on the firm’s managerial
services for devising and developing appropriate ways of organising activities is
important in constraining the firm’s rate of growth, and in eventually extending
its managerial capabilities through learning, we might be forgiven for thinking
that this new theory of the firm has no significant implications for the analysis of
markets. But that would be wrong. I referred earlier to ‘market theory’ and
‘market-like analysis’; and these phrases were in quotation marks, because in
‘market theory’ there are no markets as we understand them in practice. In fact,
6things are even worse. A few years ago, I wrote that we have no theory of
markets; what we have instead is a theory of exchange. Stephan Boehm pointed
out that we do not have a theory of exchange, in the sense of a balance of costs
and benefits, and he was right: in all standard models exchange is costless. Now
there is a formal justification for neglecting the costs of exchange in
microeconomic theory: it is simply that in any full general equilibrium, and in
the equilibria of game theory, the costs of organising future exchanges are zero,
since all exchanges that are worth while have already been arranged.
Hayek’s (1945, p. 523) well-known observation that all economic problems
arise from change is a special case of Knight’s (1921, p. 313) earlier proposition
that change ‘is a condition of the existence of any problem whatever in
connection with life and conduct’; and equilibrium theory contains no means by
which an economy can attain the equilibrium which is implicit in the theorist’s
model of any new circumstances. The particular deficiencies of perfect
competition in this respect were explored by Richardson (1960), who also
discussed various ways in which they might be overcome. Coase’s explanation of
the firm may also be regarded as a contribution to filling this lacuna in
equilibrium theory: firms are created in order, first to avoid the need to make
present contracts for uncertain future production requirements, and second to
reduce the eventual costs of arranging for these requirements to be met as they
become necessary. A firm is an investment in preparation for an uncertain future.
(For an exposition of this theme, in the guise of an analysis of long-range
planning, see Loasby 1967). Some arrangements for future production are
therefore removed from the market. The relevant costs, in Coase’s account, are
not just bargaining costs but first of all costs of discovering what arrangements
are possible – costs which, as I noted earlier, arise from incomplete and
fragmented knowledge.
7Now such costs are not likely to be confined to arrangements for
production; they are inherent in making arrangements for any kind of exchange
where knowledge is dispersed and incomplete. Coase (1988) later argued for the
recognition that all transactions incur costs, but the cost of using markets already
appears as a universal proposition in his original article. However, because, like
Penrose, he thought of the firm as a productive organisation – this is the
connection between them to which I alluded earlier – he did not observe that it
may also be possible for those with better access to specific knowledge to
provide valuable services in facilitating exchanges for which that knowledge is
relevant. Indeed, such intermediation is a phenomenon of ancient lineage, and
merchants are among the oldest of firms. This reminds us that firms may be
viable, not as an alternative to exchange, but simply because they allow people to
benefit from exchange. The distinction between production and exchange diverts
attention to the role of firms in organising both. The concept of firm as
intermediator is a natural inference from the recognition that arranging
exchanges may be costly, and it may therefore seem surprising that most
economists who are interested in what firms do have been reluctant to follow
Mark Casson’s (1982, 1997) lead in this direction.
The concept of the firm as an agent of exchange should be particularly
attractive to Austrian economists, because it focuses on entrepreneurial alertness
as the foundation of a business which is created by making a market. Making a
particular market is an essential part of the overall market process, for as
Lachmann (1986) insisted, there are many interlinked markets, each with its own
market process. In order to understand markets, we need a theory of the firm as
market-maker, as Allyn Young (1928, p. 536) implied in writing of the
‘importance which the potential market has in the planning and management of
large industries’. I suggest that such a theory should be based on the differences
between firms both in their capabilities and in their perception (as Kirzner has
insisted) of opportunities, whether for production, exchange or (as often) a
8combination of the two. In Menger’s original scheme, production entailed a
concern for marketability, and Marshall (1919, p. 181) reminded his readers that
production and marketing were parts of a single process of delivering value.
In comparison with most capability-based theorising, which focusses on
production, Casson has a very strong orientation towards customers, which has
led him to emphasise two potential reasons why firms may be able to reduce the
costs of exchange sufficiently to make a profit from intermediation. The first is
the scope for investment in transaction technologies (broadly defined) which can
be employed in managing a large volume of transactions. Supermarkets provide
an obvious modern example – here the firm is the market; but the most topical
reference is to e-commerce, in which very large accounting losses are being
incurred in the hope of creating a customer list which will yield substantial
revenue at very low costs for each transaction. Marshall (1920, p. 500)
understood the principle very well; all firms need to invest in developing both
internal and external organisations – which takes time. Such investment, like all
activities, requires appropriate capabilities.
The second reason why a firm may be able to reduce the cost of a
particular class of exchanges is its ability to specialise in collecting, interpreting
and using particular kinds of information – which also involves substantial
investment both in equipment and in developing appropriate ways of thinking
about issues. A single piece of data is meaningless without context. Information
can be formally measured in ‘bits’ only if the full set of possibilities is known;
and that is rarely possible in economic affairs. As Dick Langlois has said,
knowledge is structure; and structures have to be imposed. Cognition depends
on categories (Nooteboom 1999, pp. 191-6), and firms are, among other things,
devices for organising compatible categories within which information may be
interpreted. Indeed, Kirzner’s entrepreneurs may be characterised as people each
of whom has a distinctive way of organising information which yields
9knowledge of a profitable opportunity, and entrepreneurial firms may be
organised around entrepreneurial visions (Witt 1998) – which are imaginative
constructions by which information can be ordered into knowledge.
The Cost of Transacting
At this point we may return to transaction cost theories of the firm. Though the
relative costs of internal and external transacting are still relevant, the idea that
firms internalise transactions when that is more profitable than leaving them to
the market, which is the default case, seems less conclusive if firms have a major
role in arranging systems of exchange as well as systems of production. It hardly
seems necessary in this company to mention that production choices should
depend on the sum of production and transaction costs, where production costs
differ between organisations in accordance with their relative capabilities –
which vary over time. Let me instead comment briefly on the costs of transacting
and of governance.
One of the most standardised features of transaction cost analyses is the
assumption that the cost of any transaction is given (presumably by some kind of
production function for transactions) and constant. But this is also one of the
least justifiable of the assumptions on which transaction cost analyses are based.
Let me draw attention to two major objections. First, it should be orthodox
doctrine that the direct cost of a single transaction, like the direct cost of a single
item of production, depends upon the amount and kind of prior investment, as
already noted. Yet, although it should be obvious that setting up governance
structures requires investment, these investment costs, like the costs of setting up
market contracts, do not appear: in (non-Coasian) transaction cost theory the
only transaction costs to be considered are the rationally-expected costs that
result from alternative arrangements once in place. (Principal-agent and
10
property-rights theorists share these features: particular forms of contract are
either impossible or costless.) The investment in governance structures, of
course, is crucial to Chandler’s (1977, 1990) account of the rise of large
organisations, and should surely be a central theme in the developmental theory
of the firm which is advocated in the first paper of this workshop.
On the other hand, it is not at all orthodox doctrine that the costs of
transacting depends on who is doing the transacting; but the capabilities theory
of the firm makes precisely that claim about production, and why should it not
be extended to transacting, or to any form of governance – indeed, to any
activity, including the development of economic theory? The establishment and
management of transaction or governance relationships are activities, which
require appropriate capabilities. Like productive capabilities, the capabilities
deployed in exchange are of varying quality and applicability; though
specialised, they are not specific to a particular class of exchanges, and they
change with time and experience, leading to the perception of new exchange or
governance activities – including the reversal of past make or buy decisions.
Transaction cost economics needs to be rescued from the constraints of
equilibrium theorising (Nooteboom 1992, p. 285).
Decisions
So far, we have implicitly assumed that firms make decisions; it is time to
enquire, if only briefly, how these decisions are made. Equilibrium theory relies
on propositional logic, in which conclusions are entailed by premises; thus
decisions are determined by the choice of premises – which cannot itself be the
product of propositional logic. The premises on which rational economic agents
rely cannot be natural givens; they have to be provided. Because of bounded
rationality, they must, at best, be a truncated set. Thus rationality must be local;
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and an important function of the firm is to organise compatible sets of decision
premises for locally-interdependent decisions. But this is not all. There is rarely a
credible set of decision premises which is sufficiently tightly drawn to deliver a
necessary conclusion; as Chester Barnard (1938, p. 305) reminded us, most
decisions are not logical (though they may have logical components). Premises
are still required, to indicate for each problem what are the relevant factors, what
future possibilities should be taken into account, and what options are available
– and to indicate how the process of decision making should proceed. Moreover,
let us not forget the importance of identifying both when a decision is needed
and what it should be about. Decision-making, like production and exchange,
has to be organised. It requires appropriate capabilities, and these capabilities
develop over time in ways which are shaped by activities and the interpretations
that are placed upon them. (Decision-making skills are, of course, an aspect of
proficiency within each particular process of production and exchange.) Lane et
al (1996) present some excellent examples of decision making, which not only
illustrate the importance of non-logical connections but also the importance of
the differentiated but compatible capabilities within an organisation, and within
its network of collaborators.
Conclusion
Firms exist precisely because knowledge is incomplete, fragmented, ambiguous,
and often difficult to express in usable form. Though the need to assemble and
manage productive knowledge is central to capability-based theories, it is not
only productive knowledge that requires appropriate organisation. Moreover,
although, as Penrose pointed out, her theory necessitates a concept of a firm with
‘insides’ – an administrative framework – no theory of the firm can be complete
without attention to its ‘outsides’, as illustrated in a dissertation that I examined
on my most recent visit to Copenhagen (Andersen 1999); in Marshall’s words,
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every business needs an internal and an external organisation, to provide, in later
language, an appropriate framework within which to develop and apply its
capabilities. No two firms will have identical capabilities, because they will
construe their circumstances differently and will form different expectations.
The capabilities of a firm constitute its human and organisational capital.
The potential of this capital depends both on the ordered relationship between its
component elements and its orientation: its value depends on its future use,
which, in Shackle’s (1979, p. 26) phrase, is ‘the imagined, deemed possible’. As
time passes, the future uses will change, because of changes in the capabilities of
the firm and its rivals, and because of changes among customers and the wider
environment. There is no simple recipe for maintaining this capital intact – as
two of the most admired British companies, Sainsbury and Marks and Spencer,
have recently discovered. It is therefore just as well that people have different
expectations about the future, and about their own chances of success. As
Richardson observed, this is the essence of competition; and, as I said 23 years
ago, competition is a proper response to ignorance (Loasby 1976, p. 192).
Multiple solutions, which discomfort equilibrium theorists, provide an economy
with reserves, which Menger thought important. Each firm’s capabilities may be
called an option set, as long as this does not deceive us into believing that there
can be any demonstrably correct procedure for valuing these options; deciding
what options to construct is an entrepreneurial decision, in Knight’s sense. The
firm, because it embodies particular ways of organising knowledge, is itself a
response to ignorance, and as a participant in a competitive discovery process – a
sequence of trial and error that we may wish to call evolutionary – it is a major
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